Business League logoBusiness League
Chapter 16: Information, Risk, and Insurance

Critical Thinking Questions

10 . In an system, would you expect each person to receive in benefits pretty much what they pay in or is it just that the average benefits paid will equal the average paid? 11 . What is an actuarially fair policy? 12 . What is the problem of ? 13 . How can lead to more costly than one was expected? 14 . Define deductibles, copayments, and . 15 . How can deductibles, copayments, and reduce ? 16 . What is the key difference between a healthcare system and a system based on health maintenance organizations? 17 . How might adverse selection make it difficult for an insurance market to operate? 18 . What are some of the metrics economists use to measure health outcomes?

Critical Thinking Questions

19 . You are on the board of directors of a private high school, which is hiring new tenth-grade science teachers. As you think about hiring someone for a job, what are some mechanisms you might use to overcome the problem of ? 20 . A website offers a place for people to buy and sell emeralds, but information about emeralds can be quite imperfect. The website then enacts a rule that all sellers in the must pay for two independent examinations of their emerald, which are available to the customer for inspection. a. How would you expect this improved information to affect for emeralds on this website? b. How would you expect this improved information to affect the quantity of high-quality emeralds sold on the website? 21 . How do you think the problem of might have affected the safety of sports such as football and boxing when safety regulations started requiring that players wear more padding? 22 . To what sorts of customers would an company offer a policy with a high copay? What about a high with a lower copay?

Problems

23 . Using Exercise 16.20, sketch the effects in parts (a) and (b) on a single supply and diagram. What prediction would you make about how the improved information alters the and ? 24 . Imagine that you can divide 50-year-old men into two groups: those who have a family history of cancer and those who do not. For the purposes of this example, say that 20% of a group of 1,000 men have a family history of cancer, and these men have one chance in 50 of dying in the next year, while the other 80% of men have one chance in 200 of dying in the next year. The company is selling a policy that will pay $100,000 to the estate of anyone who dies in the next year. a. If the company were selling life separately to each group, what would be the actuarially fair for each group? b. If an company were offering life to the entire group, but could not find out about family cancer histories, what would be the actuarially fair for the group as a whole? c. What will happen to the company if it tries to charge the actuarially fair to the group as a whole rather than to each group separately?

Text from Principles of Microeconomics 3e, OpenStax, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. Access for free at openstax.org.

My notes

No notes yet on this page.